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The Terrorist Threat to the EU 
The civil war in Syria and the inability to control and defend its north western 
territory by the Iraqi government has allowed a vacuum to exist thereby enabling Islamist 
groups, in particular Islamic State (formerly Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and also referred to as 
ISIL) and the Al Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra Front to flourish and become more powerful 
in the region. These groups do not just pose a threat to the security of the Syrian/Iraqi region, 
they pose a threat to the security of nations around the world, especially EU Member States, 
including the UK. The threat is posed on two fronts. Firstly from the number of citizens from 
nation states outside Syria and Iraq who have gone to those countries to join Islamist terror 
groups who have become radicalised to such a degree they see their home state as an enemy. 
In such circumstances these citizens are more likely to plan and carry out terrorist attacks in 
their home state. The second threat posed by these groups is how their skilful use of social 
media is used to radicalise EU citizens and influence them to carry out terrorist attacks in 
their home EU Member State. 
Islamic State was originally the group AQI that split from Jabhat al-Nusra Front in 
2013. A predominantly Sunni jihadist terror group, in 2014 we witnessed the rise of Islamic 
State (also known as ISIS or ISIL).1 Of the mercenaries that have joined Islamic State, in 
January 2015 it is estimated that up to 600 UK citizens have gone to Syria and Iraq to join 
Islamic State to fight, and this could be a conservative estimate.2 This alarming increase in 
the number of citizens who have gone to Syria and Iraq to fight with Islamic state has led the 
Rob Wainwright, the director of Europol (the EU’s intelligence policing agency that has no 
                                                          
1 Malcolm Nance (2015) ‘The Terrorists of Iraq’ Boca Raton: CRC Press, pp.311-312 
2 Douglas Murray ‘Our boys in the Islamic State: Britain’s export jihad’ The Spectator 23rd August 2014 
retrieved from http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9293762/the-british-beheaders/ [accessed 12th 
September 2014] 
operation powers whose main role is to co-ordinate an assist EU Member States’ policing 
agencies) to warn of the security gap facing EU poling agencies as they try to monitor online 
communications of terrorist suspects which is compounded by the fact that by being in Syria 
and Iraq these suspects are effectively out of reach.3 More recently Rob Wainwright has 
given further concerns security and policing agencies face in monitoring electronic 
communications used by terrorists saying that hidden areas of the Internet and encrypted 
communications are making it harder to monitor terrorist suspects, adding that Tech forms 
should consider the impact sophisticated encryption software has on law enforcement. This 
can range from blogging websites to social media sources such as Twitter where Wainwright 
revealed that Islamic State is believed to have up to 50,000 different Twitter accounts, 
tweeting up to 100,000 messages a day.4 
In the Netherlands in September 2014 three Dutch citizens were arrested on suspicion 
of recruiting for Islamic State with the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service 
calling that support for Islamic State in the Netherlands amounts to a few hundred followers 
and several sympathisers.5 The danger of having Islamic State followers, even where there 
are small numbers, in the EU’s Member States was evident in May 2014 when four people 
were killed at the Jewish Museum in Brussels6 by an Islamic State militant, Muhdi 
Nemmouche.7  
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4 BBC News (2015) ‘Europol chief warns on computer encryption’ 29th March 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-32087919 [accessed 30th March 2015] 
5 Aljazeera ‘Islamic State fears take holds in Netherlands’ 5th September 2014 retrieved from  
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/09/islamic-state-fears-take-hold-netherlands-
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6 BBC News (2014) ‘Brussels Jewish Museum killings: Suspect “admits attack”’. 1st June 2014 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27654505 [accessed 11th September 2014] 
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2014 retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/06/jewish-museum-shooting-suspect-
islamic-state-torturer-brussels-syria [accessed 11th September 2014] 
 Mainly due to the threat Islamic State pose, on the 29th August the UK terrorist threat 
was raised by the UK’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre from substantial to severe as terrorist 
attack are now highly likely.8 The Monday following the raising of the UK’s terrorist threat 
level, the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron announced the UK would introduce a 
terrorism related measures that included a proposal  that airlines be forced to hand over more 
information about passengers travelling to and from conflict zones.9 Europol’s 2014 T-SAT 
Report stated that Syria and Turkey are the main destinations of choice for travellers seeking 
to joined armed terror groups due to the accessibility of their borders to Islamic state gained 
territory.10 Europol also report that specific organised facilitation networks are likely to be 
involved in ensuring a smooth transition into the more radical fighting groups such as Islamic 
State, as well as other groups such as Jabhat al- Nusra Front citing the example of 
Sharia4Belgium as one such network.11 There is no doubt that EU citizens who have travelled 
to Syria and Iraq to join groups such as Islamic State and Jahbat al-Nusra Front pose a threat 
to the EU’s security both on their return to their home state and in how the groups’ use of 
social media can influence and ultimately radicalise EU citizens to their cause. Islamic State 
have adopted another tactic in their use of social media regarding the hostages they hold by 
releasing a series of videos showing a UK citizen they hold hostage, John Cantlie, who has 
read out  messages form Islamic Sate saying they have been misrepresented by Western 
media and they will present the truth about the group in forthcoming videos.12 Clearly this is 
a cynical use of propaganda through the medium of social media as their past actions cannot 
be misrepresented and neither can the threat they pose.  
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The Threat of Islamic State/Jabhat al-Nusra Front Influenced terrorist attacks in EU 
Member States: Post Paris 2015 Attacks 
 On January 7th 2015 Europe received a stark wake-up call as the threat Islamist 
groups pose to the Continent’s sovereign states with the attack on the offices of the French 
satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo where twelve people were killed, ten of the staff of the 
magazine and two police officers who were protecting the building by Cherif and Said 
Kouachi. These two brothers were French citizens of Algerian descent who were influenced 
by Al Qaeda,13 where the Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
claimed responsibility for the attack.14 On the 8th January 2015 Amedy Coulibaly killed a 
policewoman and injured another police officer outside a metro station in Paris and on the 9th 
January he took a number of people hostage in a Jewish Supermarket in Paris, where he 
killed four of the hostages before the French police stormed the building killing Coulibaly.15 
Both he and the Kouachi brothers were killed by the French police following two respective 
siege situations.16  
 Paris was not the sole focus of Islamist terrorist activity in Europe during January 
2015. In Brussels the Belgian police executed a warrant at premises suspected to be used by 
an Islamist terrorist cell that contained citizens who had returned from fighting with Islamic 
State in Syria/Iraq. While two of the suspects were killed by the Belgian police during the 
raid, five were arrested for terrorist related offence where the terrorist cell’s targets were a 
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Belgian police station and police officers.17 The investigation led to connections in Greece 
where the Greek police arrested several people linked to the Belgian terror plot. In addition to 
this the Greek police were also searching for Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a Brussels resident of 
Moroccan origin who is believed to be a ringleader of a jihadi cell based in Belgium and who 
has links to Al Qaeda, possibly the al-Nusra Front.18 In the same week in January 2015, 
German police arrested two men in Berlin on suspicion of recruiting individuals to join 
Islamic State in Syria and for raising finances for the group.19 During this period a UK citizen, 
Imran Khawaja was convicted and received a prison sentence at the Old Baily Court in 
London for preparing acts of terrorism, attending a terrorist training camp in Syria, receiving 
training there and for possessing firearms. Khawaja had spent six months in Syria fighting 
with Islamic state and using social media sources faked his own death in an attempt to return 
to the UK.20  
 From just the terrorist activities and investigations among the EU Member States from 
the 7th to the 20th January 2015 one can see how real and lethal the terrorist threat to Europe 
is from international terrorist groups such as Islamic State and al-Nusra Front. As at the time 
of writing the fact that up to 5,000 EU citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight 
alongside these groups, it is submitted that what Europe has witnessed in the last nine months 
is only the tip of the iceberg. As more of these citizens return to Europe, the potential for 
attacks will increase and maintaining surveillance on individuals who have been identified as 
a terrorist risk will add further to the strain EU Member States security services and counter-
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terrorism police officers are currently facing as they try to prevent acts of terrorism 
happening and in keeping EU citizens safe. This point has been made by the Director of the 
EU’s policing intelligence agency Europol, Rob Wainwright. He warned that the EU’s 
policing agencies do not have the capability to monitor online communications of suspects, 
saying there is a security gap facing police forces in Europe who are trying to track down 
extremists online, with some of these extremists being effectively out of reach.21 The 
potential result of this security gap is as the head of  the UK’s national security agency MI5, 
Andrew Parker pointed out when he said it is virtually impossible to prevent every type of 
terrorist attack.22  
Passenger Name Record Data 
The EU’s Directive on Passenger Name Records 2011/0023- Information contained 
in Passenger Name Records Data  
In February 2011 the European Commission produced a proposal for a directive on the 
use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.23 At the time of its publication the 
explanation memorandum covered issues as to why the directive was needed by agencies 
involved in investigating terrorism and serious crime where a comparison was drawn between 
PNR and aircraft passenger information (API). PNR’s contain the following information: 
1. Name of Passenger; 
2. Contact details for the travel agent or airline office; 
3. Ticketing details; 
4. Itinerary of at least one segment, which must be the same for all passengers listed; 
5. Name of person providing the information or making the booking; 
6. Passenger gender; 
                                                          
21 BBC News (2015a) ‘Terror threat posed by thousands of EU nationals’ 13th January 2015 retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30799637 [accessed 22nd January] 
22 Security Service MI5 (2015) ‘Address by the Dire-General of the Security Service, Andre Parker, to the Royal 
United Services Institute at Thames House 8th January 20-15’ retrieved from 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/director-general/speeches-by-
the-director-general/director-generals-speech-on-terrorism-technology-and-accountability.html [accessed 
23rd January 2015] 
23 2011/0023 
7. Passport details (includes nationality, passport number and date of passport expiry); 
8. Date and place of birth; 
9. Billing information; 
10. Form of payment (include debit/credit card details); 
11. Contact details (potentially include landline/mobile phone numbers); 
12. Frequent flyer data; and 
13. Vendor remarks kept by the airline.24  
 
Advanced Passenger Information data (API)  
In addition to flight identification that provides the scheduled departure and arrival of 
flights and number of passengers on the flight, API’s contains the following information in 
relation to each individual passenger: 
1. passenger’s name 
2. passenger’s address; 
3. passenger’s date of birth; 
4. passenger’s gender; 
5. passenger’s nationality;  
6. passport details; 
7. passenger seating; 
8. visa details (where applicable).25  
The countries that have signed up to the requirement that passengers complete API details are: 
1. Antigua; 
2. Australia; 
3. Barbados; 
4. Canada; 
5. China; 
6. Costa Rica; 
7. Cuba; 
8. Dominican Republic; 
9. Grenada; 
10. India; 
11. Ireland; 
12. Jamaica; 
13. Japan; 
14. Maldives; 
15. Mexico; 
16. Republic of Korea; 
17. Russian Federation; 
                                                          
24 International Civil Aviation Organisation (2010) Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data Quebec: 
International Civil Aviation organisation 
25 WCO/IATA/ICAO (2013) Guidelines on Advance Passenger Information (API) retrieved from 
http://www.icao.int/Search/pages/Results.aspx?k=api paragraph 8.1.5 
18. Saint Lucia; 
19. Spain (except for Schengen zone passengers) 
20. Taiwan; 
21. Trinidad & Tobago 
22. Turkey; 
23. United Kingdom; 
24. United States 
It is the responsibility of the airline to obtain the information required under API 
procedures.26 Border control, customs and policing agencies in the respective states listed 
above can access passengers’ personal data contained in the API just prior to and on the 
arrival of the passenger. As privacy and data protection varies from state to state the API 
guidelines recommendations state that the personal data: 
1. Should be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully; 
2. Should be stored for legitimate purposes and not be  used in any way that is 
incompatible for these purposes; 
3. Should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which 
they are stored; 
4. Should be preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no 
longer for which the data is stored.27 
While the batch style of API systems exist between the participating states where the API is 
received by requesting government in advance of the flight’s arrival the ability to enhance 
aviation security via the batch style API systems is limited.28 This can be enhanced if the 
participating states adopt the interactive API system that allows a two-way communication in 
real time that initiated during check-in and allows for persons known or believed to pose an 
unacceptable risk to be identified as early as possible and persons known to be inadmissible 
to the state they are travelling to be identified prior to travel.29  
Comparison between API and PNR data and the limitations of API  
                                                          
26 NIDirect (2015) Advance registration before you travel retrieved from http://www.nidirect.gov.uk/advance-
registration-before-you-travel [accessed 19th April 2015] 
27 WCO/IATA/ICAO 2013 paragraph 9.4 
28 Ibid paragraph 5.2 
29 Ibid paragraph 5.2 
Compared to PNR data, API data is fairly limited in what information is recorded and 
accessed by border control and this limitation was recognised by the European Commission 
in the explanatory memorandum to the PNR Directive saying: 
‘API data does not enable law enforcement authorities to conduct an assessment 
of passengers and therefore do not facilitate the detection of hitherto “unknown” 
criminals or terrorists’ [my emphasis].30 
While API is useful in terrorism and organised crime investigations at port and border 
controls for investigating officers to ascertain who is on a flight list that can be checked to 
suspects already contained within intelligence systems, API is restrictive when trying to 
ascertain the identity of those who are not known on intelligence systems. Another limitation 
of API’s compared to PNR data is while API data is available from a passenger’s check-in at 
an airport, PNR data is transferred from 48 to 36 hours before departure from the Airline 
Reservation System to the Departure Control System which the border control and policing 
agencies can access. This gives those agencies more time to analyse the PNR data within 
their own intelligence systems to assess if there are any connections to terrorist or organised 
crime activity.31  
However the additional information contained in the Directive such as who made the 
booking or contact details and methods of payment can be cross-checked to see if there is a 
connection with terrorist suspect in intelligence systems. As stated above, Europol have 
already found that groups are facilitating the travel of individuals who may referred to in 
intelligence circles as clean-skins, that is they are not on any intelligence system. However if 
from the PNR data a link is made, this will greatly assist the officer in agencies investigating 
                                                          
30 2011/0023 Directive p.7 
31 ICAO/WCO/IATA (2015) Management Summary on Passenger-related Information [Umbrella Document] 
retrieved from  http://www.icao.int/Search/pages/Results.aspx?k=api [accessed 17th April 2015] p.2 
terrorism. The fact that PNR data is an important intelligence tool is also recognised in the 
PNR Directive’s explanatory memorandum.32 
Key Provisions in the 2011 PNR Directive  
While clearly stating the scope of use of PNR data was the prevention, detection and 
prevention of terrorist offences and serious crime33 the Directive recommended that Member 
States identified competent authorities to process the PNR data issued form Passenger 
Information Units.34 It is clear that no decision should be taken by the competent authority on 
the basis of a person’s race or ethnic origin, religious or philosophical belief, political opinion, 
trade union membership, health or sexual life. One concern with the Directive related to data 
retention was the protection of personal data and the transfer of data to third countries. In 
essence, the proposed period of detention of data by competent authority was 30 days, with 
the Passenger Information Unit to retain the data for 5 years.35 The protection of the data 
should be covered by the Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.36 The data 
subject has the right to expect the competent authority to fulfil their duties regarding their 
duties under the Framework Decision (article 18) and that includes the right for the data 
subject to have a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed to them by the 
applicable national law.37  
PNR data sharing between the EU and Third Countries  
Where the PNR data is transferred to a third country the Framework Decision makes 
it clear that it has to be ensured that the third country had an adequate level of protection of 
                                                          
32 Directive 2011/0023 Explanatory Memorandum p.8 
33 Directive 2011/0023 article 9 
34 Directive 2011/0023, article 5 
35 Directive 2011/0023 article 9 
36 FD 2008/977/JHA 
37 FD 2008/997/JHA article 20 
the intended data processing.38 Agreements in the exchange of data currently exist. For 
example between the European Union and the United States there is an agreement regarding 
the transfer of PNR data39 and between the EU and Australia.40  
In the agreement between the US and the EU it states the US will confirm that effective 
administrative, civil and criminal enforcement measures are available under US law for 
privacy incidents and the US Department of Homeland Security will take disciplinary action 
against persons responsible for inappropriate use of the privacy conditions.41 It also says in 
the agreement that the Department of Homeland Security will inform the relevant EU 
authorities of cases of privacy incidents involving PNR of EU citizens.42 Similar provisions 
relating to data security and integrity also are present in the agreement between the EU and 
Australia43including the separate storing of EU citizens’ PNR data and it is only stored for the 
purpose of matching with intelligence data Australian authorities have on persons suspected 
of being involved in terrorism or serious crime.44 The EU has understandably taken a strict 
approach as to how intelligence and citizens’ personal data is handled and dealt with by state 
authorities as provided in the European Commission’s overview of information management 
(Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council: Overview of 
information management in the area of freedom, security and justice COM(2010)385 final) 
which concludes saying: 
                                                          
38 FD 2008/997/JHA article 14 
39 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of 
Passenger Name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security 17434/11 
40 Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of Passenger name 
records (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 10093/11 
41 17434/11 article 5(6) 
42 17434/11 article 5(4) 
43 10093/11 article 9 
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‘Adopting … a principled approach to policy development and evaluation is 
expected to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of current and future 
instruments in a manner that fully respects fundamental rights.’45 
 
This is seen in the current Directive regarding the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences46 that is expected to be introduced in 2016. 
Wider Surveillance on Electronic Communication 
 In March 2015 the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) 
published is report on privacy and security where among its key findings it states the legal 
framework in the UK on surveillance, especially in relation to electronic communications has 
developed piecemeal and is unnecessarily complicated resulting in the Committee having 
serious concerns in the, ‘…resulting lack of transparency, which is not in the public 
interest.’47 As a result among its recommendations is the key recommendation that all the 
current legal frameworks on surveillance are replaced a new Act of Parliament governing the 
intelligence and security agencies consolidating the legal current provisions.48 The ISC added 
in their recommendations that new legislation should clearly list the intrusive capability that 
specifies: 
1. The purposes for which the intrusive power is used including the protection of 
national security or the detection or prevention of serious crime; 
2. The overreaching human rights obligations constraining such use; 
3. Whether the capability is to be used in the pursuit of a specific person, location or 
target or in relation to a wider search to discover unknown threats; 
                                                          
45 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council: Overview of information 
management in the area of freedom, security and justice COM(2010)385 final p.28 
46 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals data 2012/0010 
(COD) 
47 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2015) ‘Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent 
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48 Ibid p. 118 
4. Authorisation procedures must include review, inspection and oversight, that should 
be carried out by the judiciary; 
5. Retention periods, methods of storage and destruction arrangements; 
6. The circumstances (including the constraints) in which any intelligence obtained may 
be shared with intelligence, law enforcement or other bodies in the UK or overseas 
partners; 
7. Transparency and reporting requirements.49 
 
The ISC also examined authorisation for carrying out electronic surveillance that included a 
summary of the expected collateral intrusion, including an estimate of the numbers of 
innocent people who may be impacted and the extent to which the privacy of those innocent 
people will be intrude upon.50 
 The ISC’s findings have not been universally welcomed. The UK civil liberties group, 
Liberty in their report to the ISC during the ISC’s inquiry into privacy and security the group 
says they have no confidence in the ISC’s ability to, ‘…provide effective oversight of the 
security agencies’.51 Underpinning this view is Liberty’s perception that the ISC is 
inadequately staffed and funding and in not having sufficient expertise. However its more 
scathing criticism of the ISC is Liberty’s assertion that the ISC’s annual reports: 
‘consistently fail to critically analyse the agencies’ claims and its 
recommendations to not seek to hold the agencies’ to account but rather “do the 
agencies” bidding on matters as varied as funding and the creation of closed 
courts. …Liberty regards the ISC more as a spokesperson of the agencies than a 
credible oversight body.’52 
This view of the ISC came out when members of four privacy campaign groups gave 
evidence to the ISC’s inquiry into privacy and security where in essence they objected to the 
principle of collecting internet communications in bulk. When members of the Committee 
asked the four privacy campaigners if evidence emerged through bulk data collection that led 
                                                          
49 Ibid pp.118-119 
50 Ibid p.119 
51 Liberty (2014) ‘Liberty’s evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s inquiry into Privacy and 
Security’ retrieved from http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/ [accessed 20th March 2015] p.4 
52 Ibid, p.4 paragraph 5 
to terrorists being arrested and terrorist attacks being prevented and rather than allow 
intelligence agencies to use bulk data collection methods, as a matter of principle they believe 
so strongly that bulk data collection is unacceptable that terrorist attacks is a price a free 
society has to pay. The four privacy campaigners said it was with Isabella Sankey, the 
director of policy at the group Liberty said, ‘Yes …That is the price you pay to live in a free 
society.’53 When asked by the Committee if her view would change if the electronic bulk data 
collection was authorised under a legal framework, Sankey’s reply was, ‘No’.54 
 For some reading this Liberty’s response may appear astounding and irresponsible 
and for others this stance is plausible. What this shows is how polarised views are on 
practises related to surveillance of electronic communications that gathers bulk data 
collection. Where such an extremist position is taken in relation to the protection of an 
individual’s liberty and data protection as that by Liberty it does not assist in reaching 
realistic compromises in both the law or in  governmental policy directing agencies involved 
in surveillance. The interests of national security and individual liberty are not exclusive, they are 
inclusive. They are not opposing poles but a seamless web of protection incumbent upon the state.55  
Concerns over the Surveillance Society: The Snowden Revelations 
In April 2013, the Committee on Civil Liberties of the European Parliament (LIBE) 
saw the PNR Directive being too wide and consequently refused to agree for the need of the 
Directive. The concerns mainly cantered on Passenger Information Unit as having the 
potential to refuse to erase a person’s data even if they are not suspected of a crime and the 
Committee had a concern the Directive left it open to authorities to carry out offender 
                                                          
53 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament  (see note 47) pp. 35-36 
54 Ibid p.36 
55 International Commission of Jurists, (2009) Assessing Damage, Urging Action Geneva: ICR, p.21 
profiling on individuals who matched certain behaviour.56 2013 was a year where fears of a 
surveillance society were confirmed following the revelations by the former US National 
Security Agency (NSA) employee, Edward Snowdon on the practices of the NSA and the 
UK’s General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in particular Operation PRISM and 
the bulk surveillance of electronic forms of communication and telephone use, some of which 
was unauthorised.57 The shock waves of the NSA’s actions reverberated around the world, 
more so when it was revealed that politicians in the EU’s Member States were also spied on 
by the NSA, in particular the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.58 As Greenwald (the 
Guardian newspaper journalist Snowden passed the NSA documentation onto) says, what is 
more remarkable are the revelations that the NSA was spying on millions of European 
Citizen adding; 
‘…in addition to foreign leaders the United states … also spied extensively on 
international organisations such as the United Nations to gain a diplomatic 
advantage.’59  
It is understandable why there is such a concern in recommending further powers of 
surveillance to national security and policing agencies, yet a balance has to be drawn between 
the needs of protecting the interests of security within the EU’s Member States and the rights 
of individual citizens. 
In June 2013 the UK newspaper The Guardian and the US newspaper The Washington 
Post broke with the news story regarding the NSA and the Prism programme that gave US 
Federal agencies direct access to servers in the biggest web firms including Google, 
                                                          
56 The European Citizen (2014) ‘Draft EU PNR Directive voted down at Committee Stage’ retrieved from 
http://theeuropeancitizen.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/draft-eu-pnr-directive-voted-down-at.html [accessed 7th 
September 2014] 
57 Greenwald, Glenn (2014) No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the US Surveillance State New 
York: Metropolitan Books, pp.33-42 
58 Ibid p.141  
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Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, Skype and Apple.60 Snowdon released top secret documents to 
a Guardian journalist, Glenn Greenwald who, in the first of a number of reports, revealed the 
NSA was collecting telephone records of millions of US customers under a top secret order 
issued in April 2013 adding that, ‘…the communication records of millions of US citizens are 
being collected indiscriminately and in bulk regardless of whether they are suspected of any 
wrongdoing’.61 Adding the NSA’s mission had transformed from being exclusively devoted 
to foreign intelligence gathering Greenwald said it now focused on domestic communications.  
As the revelations from the documents Snowdon passed on regarding the FSA’s 
activities increased, The Guardian reported that GCHQ also gained access to the network of 
cables carrying the world’s phone calls and Internet traffic and processed vast streams of 
sensitive personal information, sharing this with the NSA.62 This followed on from earlier 
reports that GCHQ accessed the FSA’s Prism programme to secretly gather intelligence, 
where between May 2012 –April 2013, 197 Prism intelligence reports were passed onto the 
UK’s security agencies, MI5, MI6 and Special Branch’s Counter-Terrorism Unit.63 GCHQ’s 
actions led to the German Justice Minister writing to British ministers regarding an allegation 
of mass surveillance by British intelligence asking for reassurance the actions were legal and 
if they were targeting German citizens.64 With reports from The Guardian that FSA actions 
were posing a threat to the privacy of EU citizens, this was a cause of concern for the EU’s 
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Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) resulting in EU’s Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding 
stating: 
‘The European Commission is concerned about the possible consequences on EU 
citizens’ privacy. The Commission has raised this systematically in its dialogue with the 
US authorities, especially in the context of the negotiations of the EU-US data protection 
agreement in the field of police and judicial co-operation…’65 
 
During this dialogue the difference in legal culture between the EU and the US raised 
its head regarding individual’s rights in the respective jurisdictions with the EU’s focus being 
the dignity of citizens. In protecting fundamental human rights under the aegis of the rule of 
law the EU requires a system of protection of an individual citizen’s data privacy.66 There is 
no such explicit protection to a general right to privacy under the US Bill of Rights rather it is 
inferred in the First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.67 This is important as Snowdon’s 
revelations had the potential to damage not only diplomatic relations between the US and EU 
Member States, but also affect the terrorism intelligence sharing between European counter-
terrorism agencies via Europol and US federal agencies. To prevent US/UK diplomatic 
relations with the rest of the EU Member States deteriorating further, senior US and UK 
politicians were forced to speak openly and defend the actions of the FSA and GCHQ. The 
UK’s Foreign minister, William Hague said that both nations, ‘…operated under the rule of 
law’, with GCHQ being, ‘…scrupulous in complying with the law’ and used the intelligence 
to protect citizens’ freedoms.68 
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 As a result of handing the secret documents to journalists the US Justice Department 
filing criminal charges against Snowden for espionage and theft of government documents 
and a provisional arrest warrant was issued by a federal court in the Eastern District of 
Virginia.69 To evade prosecution Snowden left the USA where he was granted temporary 
asylum by the Russian Government, causing further friction in the political relations between 
the US and Russia.70 Referring to ‘top secret’ documents Snowden passed on to them, The 
Guardian reported that from 2010-2013 the US government paid GCHQ  £100 million to 
secure access and influence over the UK’s intelligence gathering programmes.71 As these 
revelations were claiming to come from the secret documents Snowden passed on to 
Greenwald, it triggered the security services to act to retrieve the documentation at the 
earliest opportunity. 
It is not Just a UK Issue: Digital Rights Case and EU Directive 2006/24/EC on 
Data Retention 
 Of the recent decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on data retention and 
privacy protection is that of the Grand Chamber in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications and others.72 The case centred mainly on Directive 2006/24/EC that lays 
down the obligation on the providers of publicly available electronic communications 
services or public communications networks to retain certain data generated or processed by 
them. The ECJ also considered the provisions of Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy with the aim to harmonise Member 
States’ legal provisions regarding the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
especially in the processing of personal data in the electronic sector. In essence the ECJ found 
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that the 2006 and the 2002 Directives were inlaid in relation to the retention of data processed 
in connection with the provision of available electronic communications data. Key to this 
decision was article 4 of the 2006 Directive that states member States shall adopt measures to 
ensure that data retained is provided only to the competent national authorities in specific 
cases in accordance with national law adding: 
‘The procedures to be followed and the conditions to be fulfilled ion order to gain 
access to retained data in accordance with necessity and proportionality 
requirements shall be defined by each Member state in its national law, subject to 
the relevant provisions of EU law or public international law and in particular the 
[European Convention on Human Rights] as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights’73 
The ECJ said that EU legislation must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope 
and application of the measure in question and imposing minimum safeguards so that persons 
whose data have been retained have sufficient guarantees to effectively protect their personal 
data against the risk of abuse and against unlawful access and use of that data.74 
 Looking at the inadequacies of article 4 in the 2006 Directive the ECJ held that 
article 4 did not expressly provide that access to the use of the data was strictly restricted for 
the purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious offences or of conducting 
criminal prosecutions relating to such crimes; all the conditions specified in article 4 as that 
Member States defined procedures to followed that were in accordance with necessity and 
proportionality requirements.75 Examining the provisions of article 7 of the 2006 Directive 
regarding data protection and security that the ECJ said should be read in conjunction with 
article 4 held that it does not ensure a particularly high level of protection and security and 
the Directive as a whole did not ensure the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of 
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the data retention period.76 The ECJ did recognise the importance of data retention in relation 
to investigations into serious crime and terrorism saying: 
‘…it is of the upmost importance in order to ensure public security and its 
effectiveness may depend to a great extent on the use of modern investigation 
techniques’77 
In saying this, the ECJ held that it was the fact the 2006 Directive’s data retention measures 
were too vague to even justify these objectives as the rationale for the data retention. Simply 
stating retention should be carried out under the principles of necessity and be proportionality 
cannot be justified in imposing limitations on citizens’ rights as the imposition of limitations 
requires a legitimate aim and terrorism is certainly a legitimate aim that is recognised as one 
that meets the objective s of general interest recognised by the EU and that includes 
corresponding with the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others, including the 
important right, the right to life. As Ojanen in his analysis of the Digital Rights Case states, 
the moor systemic and wide the collection, retention and analysis of bulk data becomes, the 
closer it can be seen as moving towards the core area of privacy and data retention adding: 
‘…the closer it can be seen as moving towards the core area of privacy and data 
protection with the outcome that at least the most massive, systematic forms of 
collection and analysis of [bulk data] can be regarded as constituting an intrusion 
into the inviolable core of privacy and data protection’78 
 
As Ojanen recognised, the ECJ decision in Digital Rights is not a ‘total knockout’ to 
mandatory retention79 what is needed is by the EU in drawing up legislation is that 
specifically gives the legitimate aim for the retention being to support investigations into acts 
of terrorism or serious organised crime such as human trafficking, specifying realistic periods 
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of data retention and sufficient safeguards into protecting rights of privacy and data 
protection. 
EU Data Protection and Privacy Laws 
European Union law is clear that personal data is to be protected. Article 16 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that everyone has the right to the 
protection of personal data concerning them80 and the European Parliament and the Council 
must act in accordance with ordinary legislative procedure that will lay down rules relating to 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by Union 
institutions, bodies, office and agencies when carrying out activities that fall with the scope of 
EU law81 as does article 39 in the Treaty of Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union also is clear that everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning them.82 In that right it states, ‘…data must be processed fairly for specified 
purposes on the basis of consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law’ 83 [My emphasis]. This is in addition to the respect the state must have for the 
right of a person to their private and family life in both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union84 and the Council of Europe’s European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) (Article 8). Article 8 of the ECHR does allow for the state to interfere with the right 
to privacy where it is under an act proscribed by law and it is necessary in democratic state 
when it is in the interests of national security or to prevent crime or disorder. 
New EU Data Protection Regulation and Directive  
The EU was looking to amend the data protection provisions it currently has in place 
prior to the Snowden revelations, however the EU is introducing changes to take effect by 
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2016 at the latest that will tighten up EU citizens’ data protection, in particular regarding data 
exchange with third countries. The two pieces of legislation proposed are: 
 Personal data protection regulation: processing and free movement of data (General 
Data Protection Regulation);85 
 Personal data protection directive: processing of data for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or execution of criminal 
penalties and free movement of data.86  
The regulation will have an impact in the private sector as businesses will have to set up new 
processes to facilitate the rights of citizens to access information held on them. Regarding the 
directive, the transfer of data to a third country/international organisation will only occur if it 
is for the same purpose as the directive and that organisation is a public authority in a state 
that provides a proper level of data protection within a country where appropriate safeguards 
are established in a legally binding instrument (article 33). 
 Post the January 2015 terrorism events in Europe, the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs 
Commission has brought back on the EU’s legislative agenda a proposal for blanket 
collection and storage of passenger name record data for up to five years on all records of 
passengers flying in and out of Europe. It is not a given that the plans will become legislation 
in the EU as the vice-chairman of the European Parliament’s civil liberties committee, Jan 
Philip Albrecht sees the plans as an affront, in particular to the EU’s main court, the 
European Court of Justice decision in Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de 
Prrteccion de Datos (APED)87, which held in 2014 that data retention without any link to risk 
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or suspicion is not proportionate. For Albrecht a plan to blanketly retain all passenger data 
would be open to a breach of fundamental rights.88  
Surveillance of Electronic Communication and Bulk Data Directive 
Internet an Communications Service Providers Lack of Disclosure in Suspected 
Terrorism Related Communication 
 In the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) report on 
the intelligence relating the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby by Michael Adebolajo and 
Michael Adebowale outside Woolwich Barracks, London in May 2013 concern was 
expressed in the report that Adebolajo and Adebowale’s electronic communication with 
known sources of information including those from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) based in Yemen was not picked up by the UK’s national security or counter-
terrorism policing officers.89 One piece of communication that was not acted on was 
communication via Facebook between Adebowale and AQAP operative referred to as 
FOXTROT, who was not known at the time to UK national security or counter-
terrorism policing agencies, in late 2012. In the communications with FOXTROT 
Adebowale expressed in a graphic and emotive manner his desire to murder a British 
soldier. FOCTROT encouraged Adebowale and suggested several methods of how he 
could successfully carry out the attack. 
 The company on whose system the online exchange took place between 
Adebowale and FOPXTROT closed some of Adebowale’s accounts before the murder 
of Lee Rigby was carried out. In their inquiry leading to the report the ISC learnt that 
internet and communications service providers use various automated techniques for 
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identifying accounts they provider believes are breaking the terms of service such as 
those linked to child exploitation and to illegal acts such as inciting violence.90 One 
might expect that the ISP and CSP companies would routinely pass information relating 
to communications of this type to the relevant authorities, but as GCHQ reported to the 
ISC the authorities only instigate actions when they receive a tip off or a complaint 
from another user or an authority. GCHQ added that for accounts linked to terrorism, 
information is rarely passed to the authorities unlike child exploitation cases where ISP 
and CSP’s regularly pass on information to the appropriate authorities.91 
 Even though it was clear that Adebowale’s eleven social media accounts were 
linked to terrorist activity the company disabled the accounts as a result of an 
automated process and did not manually review the content of the accounts nor pass on 
any information to the relevant authorities. Regarding this practice by ISP and CSP’s, 
the tone of the ISC’s report recommends that even if the ISP or CSP does not take 
action themselves to interrogate an account with suspected links to terrorism they could 
notify the relevant authorities that they had detected such an account adding: 
‘In the case of Adebowale, has MI5 been told that there was further intelligence 
to suggest that he was in contact with terrorist organisations, this might have led 
to different investigative decisions, which might in turn have led them to 
Adebowale’s exchange with FOXTROT in December 2012’.92 
As a result the ISC recommended that when possible links to terrorism trigger accounts 
to be closed the ISP and CSP’s accept their responsibility to review the accounts 
immediately and if the review provides information of a specific intention to commit a 
terrorist act is present to pass this information onto the appropriate authority. It is such 
a policy adopted by ISP and CSP’s that has led to the Director of GCHQ saying: 
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‘However much [technology companies] may dislike it, they have become the 
command-and-control networks of choice for terrorists and criminals’.93 
 This situation is not unique to the UK, this is an international problem and 
requires an international response for which the EU is well placed to take a lead on. If 
this is not done then Member States will take unilateral decisions or though bi-lateral 
agreements with other nation states action to take a legislative position regarding the 
requirement that ISP and CSP’s co-operate to supply of information that is suspected to 
be terrorist related. A problem with such a scenario is that many ISP and CSP’s are 
based outside many Member States, even the EU itself and as such are not obliged to 
retain and provide communications data to relevant authorities. However the EU 
represents 28 states and as such it has the potential leverage to encourage third 
countries such as the US, Canada, and those states with whom the EU and EU 
Neighbourhood Polices agreement. Prima facie this may appear an idealistic and naive 
suggestion, but international pressure, demonstrating the concerns for national security 
an issue underpinned by the right to life of citizens, where negotiations with ISP and 
CSP’s occur to draw up a uniform policy in forwarding of communications data to 
relevant authorities is more likely to obtain co-operation with ISDP and CSP’s. One 
reason why the EU is ideally placed to take the lead is that rights to privacy and data 
protection are embedded in EU law. It is the protection of their customers’ privacy that 
is sacrosanct with ISP and CSP’s. The position the EU holds in relation to privacy and 
data protection makes the EU more likely to be heard by ISP and CSP’s as an approach 
that is simply one of compulsory supply of data without clear and enshrined data 
protection is not the ideal approach to take with companies, especially here you are 
looking for co-operation. As such this will help to ensure the needs of national security 
are balanced with the rights to privacy and data protection is equitably balanced. 
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The Example of the UK’s Response to the Digital Rights Case 
 In response to the ECJ’s decision in the Digital Rights case and in order to 
replace the 2006 Data Retention Directive94 an example of a Member State taking a 
unilateral response to this issue is the UK and the Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA). Section 1 DRIPA allows the Secretary of State to issue a 
notice to ISP and CSP’s to retain relevant communications data (a retention notice) if 
the Secretary of State considers the requirement to be necessary and proportionate 
where: 
1. It is in the interests of national security; 
2. To prevent or detect crime or preventing disorder; 
3. It is in the interests of the UK’s economic well-being; it is in  the interests of 
public safety; 
4. It is for the purposes of protecting public health; 
5. It is for the purpose if assessing or collecting tax, duty or levy or other 
imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department; 
6.  It is for the purpose in an emergency of preventing death or injury or any 
damage to a person’s physical or mental health or of mitigating any injury or 
damaged to a person’s physical or mental health; 
7. It is for a purpose which is specified by the Secretary of State.95 
In doing so the retention notice can relate to a particular operator or any description of 
operators where the notice will require the retention of all data or of the type described 
in the notice and specify the period the data should be detained,96 with the maximum 
period of data retention not exceeding 12 months.97 In order to make requests on ISP 
and CSP’s on a lawful footing DRIPA has amended section 5 (3) of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) that is concerned with the grounds necessary for 
issuing of warrants to intercept communications, adding the issuing of a warrant is 
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necessary where in the circumstances it appears to the Secretary of State the warrant is 
relevant to the interests of national security.98  
 Where a nation state legislates the granting of powers for the likes of retention 
notices and warrants is all well and good when applying to companies located within 
that state but the law of one state is not normally applicable to companies located 
outside that state, and many ISP and CSP’s are located outside the UK, which can in 
effect make these powers redundant. DRIPA has tried to address this issue by amending 
RIPA to allow for an interception warrant to be delivered at the company’s principal 
office within the UK and if that company does not have a principal office at any place 
in the UK here that company carries on their business or conducts its activities.99 
Should there still is non-compliance by that company is outside the UK to the warrant 
DRIPA amends section 11 of RIPA to give effect that the warrant is enforceable by 
civil proceedings.100 To assist in ensuring there are ways of improving the access of 
electronic communications data the UK appointed its former US Ambassador, Sir Nigel 
Sheinwald as a special envoy on intelligence and law enforcement data sharing. His 
role is lead discussions with key international partners and ISP and CSP’s seeking to: 
1. Identify ways of taking forward the UK Government’s relationships with ISP 
and CSP’s to ensure the UK Government’s work is coherent with its broader 
relationship with these providers; 
2. Consider wider international arrangements in this area; 
3. Ensure that any new arrangements observe the requirement that data is 
requested and provided only where necessary and proportionate for the purposes 
of national security and the prevention or detection of serious crime; 
4. Other measure to work with the US on the range of options to strengthen 
reliable access through Mutual legal Assistance Treaty systems, other legal or 
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political frameworks or remedies for better arrangements for direct requests 
form UK agencies to companies that hold the data.101 
It is submitted that in essence one nation state like the UK that attempts to apply a 
tough legal stance against large transnational companies such as Facebook, Twitter and 
other ISP and CSP’s will not encourage compliance by these companies to request and 
can only result in protracted legal battles that could in effect cost the state more both 
financially as well as politically. This example demonstrates why it is preferable for 
nation states to work together when making requests with ISP and CSP’s in relation to 
data retention and in gaining access to certain information, even when related to acts of 
terrorism. As stated, due to the emphasis it places on rights to privacy and data 
protection the EU is not only best placed to take a lead but ethically it is best positioned 
to negotiate alongside third countries with ISP and CSP’s to assist in the fight against 
terrorist by simply manually reading communication where it is suspected that 
communication is related to terrorism. 
The Category of Data Subject of Wider Surveillance 
 This proposal is not advocating for a blanket interception of electronic 
communication, this proposal is requesting that consideration be given to introducing 
legislation that allows for wider powers of surveillance of targeted electronic 
communication related to terrorism. Communications data includes details of time, 
duration, originator and recipient of communication that is the who, when and where of 
communication, but not the content of the communication itself.102 Breaking it down to 
three distinct categories communications data include: 
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1. Traffic Data – is where communications is or may be transmitted through a 
telecommunications system that identifies a person, the apparatus used or the 
location to and from the communication is made. It can identify or select the 
apparatus by which the communication is transmitted. Traffic data comprises of 
signals for the actuation of the apparatus used for the purposes of a 
telecommunications system for effecting the transmission of the communication. 
It also can identify the time at which the communication occurs or can identify 
the data comprised in or associated with the communication; 
2. Use Data – relates to the actual information related to the use made by the 
person of a telecommunications service or is in connection with the provision or 
sue by a person of a telecommunications system, but does not contain the 
contents of any communication. In other words it is simply the data relating to 
the use made by a person of a communications service; 
3. Subscriber Data – this is the information held or obtained by the ISP or CSP 
where the information is about the person using the service provided by the ISP 
or CSP. This will include information on people who are subscribers to an ISP 
or CSP without necessarily using that service and those who use 
communications without necessarily subscribing to it103 
This is bulk data (also referred to as metadata) and while not being able to see the 
content of communications it allows national security and counter-terrorism agencies to 
trace and acquire information on the movements of a person. It is essential that in allow 
such agencies to carry out surveillance on electronic communications data that there are 
stringent controls in place in both the granting of an authority to carry out this type of 
surveillance. 
Europol and Intelligence Exchange 
Legislative Changes making Europol an EU Body 
 One issue that could cause a blockage to these proposals is the current position 
of Europol, especially in relation to working with Member States’ national security 
agencies. Two important documents have raised the importance of the role Europol 
plays in assisting in counter-terrorism and crime investigations, the EU Council 
Decision of the 6th April 2009 establishing Europol104 and articles 87 and 88 of the 
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Lisbon Treaty. The 2009 Council Decision has in effect transformed Europol into a 
European agency as evidenced by its funding by the EU budget, the formalising of 
Europol’s staffing structure and changes regarding Europol’s co-operation with third 
countries and organisation.105 The 2009 Council Decision gives Europol a legal 
personality106 where it states Europol’s objective is to support and strengthen action by 
the competent authorities of the Member States and their mutual cooperation in 
combating terrorism (and organised crime and other forms of serious crime).107 Article 
88(1) of the Lisbon Treaty states Europol’s mission: 
‘…shall be to support and strengthen action my Member States’ police authorities 
and other law enforcement services and their mutual co-operation in preventing 
and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and 
forms of rime which affect a common interest covered by a Union policy.’ [my 
emphasis] 
There are two problems that still exist in relation to Member States’ attitudes towards 
sharing intelligence with Europol. They are the ability for Member states to negotiate 
their own bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements and it appears that there is no obligation 
on Member States’ national security agencies to co-operate with Europol. 
Bi-Lateral Agreements Undermining Europol 
 Coolsaet observes that involvement of more actors in the counter-terrorism 
endeavour at Europol has, ‘…reignited the traditional reluctance of member States to 
transfer confidential information to the organisation’.108 Added to this, what is 
hindering Europol’s effective functioning as Europe’s primary law enforcement agency 
is Member States’ national preference for bilateral relationships and the parallel 
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participation in informal, practitioner-led networks.109 The effect of this is in limiting 
the capability of Europol’s co-operation, and that is not just between EU Member 
States but with Europol’s co-operation agreements with third countries. As Kaunert and 
Leonard point out, while Europol has described its co-operation with the US counter-
terrorism agencies as excellent; 
‘…[Europol] has acknowledged that its cooperation with the FBI has been more 
limited so far, because the FBI has been encouraged to prioritise its bilateral 
liaison network of legal attachés in the embassies of EU Member States’110 
  
The establishment of bi-lateral agreements and the lack of full co-operation between 
EU Member States and Europol can be traced over the last decade, even up to the present day. 
Examples of these close international relations on terrorism related issues include the UK 
with Pakistan and France with Algeria as well as Germany allowing US prosecutors and FBI 
agents to carry out investigations with a German federal prosecutor.111 Perhaps the prime 
example of how up to 2010 EU Member States undermined Europol is through the signing of 
multi-lateral agreements outside the EU. The best two examples are seen with the 2003 G6 
Agreement and the 2005 Prum Treaty. The G6 was established in May 2003 and consists of 
the six largest EU Member States (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, who 
joined in 2006) who out of frustration with the EU’s bureaucratic JHA structures set up the 
G6 group to discuss issues of internal security, including terrorism.112 The G6 was not simply 
a talking shop. In 2005 it agreed to create a common database of individuals suspected of 
connections to terrorist organisations and in March 2006 it agreed to create multilateral police 
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support teams in cases of serious terrorist attacks, as well as joint investigation teams to 
investigate terrorism and organised crime.113 In May 2005 seven EU Member States, the 
Netherlands, Belgium. Luxembourg, Austria, France, Germany and Spain signed the Prum 
Treaty to step up cross-border co-operation, particularly in combating terrorism and the 
Treaty includes an exchange system of DNA profiles, fingerprints, vehicle registration data 
and data on aircraft security.114 As a result Europol’s work has been seen as merely 
complementing a Member State’s national agency’s own analysis and the multi-lateral co-
operation established with other services.115  
However there have been positives in Europol developing agreements with third 
countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy (EPN) as seen in the Middle East and the 
Maghreb resulting in agreements between Europol and Morocco, Jordan, Algeria116 and 
Israel that has built up strong co-operation in the area counter-terrorism.117 Even with these 
Southern Mediterranean ENP’s there are obstacles to developing co-operation on terrorism 
issues. There are two key reasons for this. One reason being Western states involvement in 
conflicts in Middle East and North African conflicts which included EU member States such 
as Iraq in 2003. Secondly, many of the Southern Mediterranean ENP states are not 
democratically elected governments and those with authoritarian tendencies are more likely 
to try and enhance their popularity by not complying with Western requests for co-
operation.118 In relation to international terrorism, while the EU has some responsibilities for 
strategic decision making, it does not play a significant operational or practical role in the 
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fight against terrorism.119 This could help to explaining why both amongst EU Member States 
and the EU with third countries there is that reluctance to share fully terrorism related 
intelligence. 
The Relationship between EU Member States’ Security Agencies and Europol 
The second problem exists in relation to Member States’ attitude towards sharing 
intelligence with Europol is the lack of an obligation on Member States’ national security 
agencies to co-operate. One issue potentially underpinning this problem is Member States 
could see this as ceding further sovereignty to the EU on issues traditionally dealt with by 
nation states. This could explain why some Member States have been reluctant to give the EU 
further powers on dealing with terrorism, especially in relation to intelligence exchange as 
they see the EU interfering with Member States’ existing laws, national security practices and 
relationships with third countries.120 Muller-Wille notes  as national counter-terrorism 
agencies will be judged and held accountable for their success against international terrorism 
to their own Member State Government and that state’s citizens, those agencies, ‘…cannot 
and will not rely on Europol’s contribution’.121 Even during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations a 
large number of Member States, in particular the UK and France successfully insisted that 
intelligence matters should remain outside the realm of the integration process. As Coolsat 
observes, the UK was able at the eleventh hour to insert into the Lisbon Treaty in article (4.2) 
that national security which includes the governance of the intelligence services remains the 
sole responsibility of each Member State. Article 4.2 states: 
‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as 
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political 
and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect 
their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
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State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, 
national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.’ [my 
emphasis] 
In trying to pin down the key rationale behind this thinking could be the role of 
intelligence. The problem for Europol is it is seen as a policing not a security agency. These 
two agencies see and use intelligence differently with the police tending to use intelligence to 
gain information and evidence on targets they are about to arrest whereas security agencies 
are interested in intelligence to profile individuals and group that pose a threat to security 
without prosecutorial purposes.122 This is crucial point as it could be the EU’s data protection 
laws that is an inhibiting factor in Member States wanting to involve their national 
security/intelligence agencies in co-operation with the EU, especially Europol. As Muller-
Wide notes, legislation protecting civil liberties does not allow security services to intrude 
into the private space of citizens.123 Commenting on this issue Kaunert and Leonard say that 
if the EU became more flexible on the issue of data protection this could pave the way to 
increased police and law enforcement co-operation in counter-terrorism,124 even increased 
co-operation between EU Member State national security/intelligence services. 
Accountability of Europol and the Rule of Law 
There is a reason to be optimistic about future developments in the role of Europol 
and terrorism related intelligence exchange and these come from the changes to the legal 
instruments governing Europol. These changes regarding Europol’s role are important for 
two reasons that centre on accountability. Firstly, through the hierarchy of agencies 
associated with the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Commission, Europol has a vertical legal 
legitimacy that is identifiable when compared the horizontal role of agencies made under the 
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multi-lateral agreements.125 This is important regarding accountability as the ToL provisions 
brings Europol under the jurisdiction and scrutiny of the ECJ. The second reason why this 
development is important concerns the actions of Europol within the legal principle of the 
rule of law. As Europol’s actions can be scrutinised by the ECJ as well as the EU Parliament: 
‘The constitutive role of the rule of law relates to the means by which the 
community is governed: through law. The law regulates social relationships and 
therefore effective enforcement of the law is constitutive for the rule of law’.126  
 
This is important as such accountability would satisfy intelligence gathering and exchange is 
operating within a legal framework balanced by the law governing rights to privacy and data 
protection. 
In its desire to ensure it can be an effective international actor, the EU’s counter-
terrorism measures in particular have led to an increased divergence of Member States’ law 
that can be achieved by replacing the framework decisions with regulations and directives 
that are more effective.127 Supporting this and the Treaty of Lisbon has been the Stockholm 
Programme128 mapping out the 2010-2014 plan to provide an open and secure Europe, 
serving and protecting citizens.129 This programme stresses that EU criminal law and counter-
terrorism measures will be pursued on the basis of the constitutional arrangements brought 
into place by the Treaty of Lisbon. This includes co-operation in the collection, storage, 
processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information between EU Member State 
competent authorities.130 The rationale for this, as Murphy’s study recognised, is with the 
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volume of EU criminal law and counter-terrorism measures is set to increase in the coming 
years131 it will require stricter adherence to mutual co-operation between the Members States 
and Europol as well as enhancing the reputation and reliability of Europol’s role as an 
international actor with Member States and third countries. One way forward would be 
moving from the traditional stance of the intelligence and police community regarding 
intelligence exchange to move from a need to know basis to a need to share.132 The 
advantages of moving to a sharing culture regarding terrorism intelligence is as Occhipinti 
points out  it emphasises the responsibility to provide where intelligence data is unlocked 
from a fragmented  technology infrastructure spanning multiple intelligence agencies and 
make intelligence readily discoverable and accessible from the earliest point at which an 
analyst can add value.133 With the main aim of any counter-terrorism activity is to prevent 
acts of terrorism occurring thereby protecting the right to life of citizens and with the threat of 
international terrorism increasing the potential for terrorist activity this is the most logical 
way to go forward in countering terrorism. 
Recommendations 
PNR Directive 
While the Directive 2012/0010 (COD) is expansive in its coverage of criminal activity it 
is submitted that a separate directive is required to deal with the transfer of PNR. Building on 
the 2011 draft PNR Directive, a new draft text on an EU system for the use of PNR data was 
tabled by lead Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Timothy Kirkhope (ECR, UK) 
that was discussed in the LIBE Committee on 26 February 2015.  An evaluation of the 
necessity and proportionality of the proposal in the face of current security threats, its scope 
(list of offences covered), retention periods, the inclusion or exclusion of intra-EU flights, the 
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connection with the on-going data protection reform, as well as the consequences of the EU 
Court of Justice judgement annulling the 2006 data retention directive, were among the issues 
discussed by MEPs. The 2011 Commission proposal would require more systematic 
collection, use and retention of PNR data on passengers taking “international” flights (those 
entering the EU from, or leaving it for, a third country), and would therefore have an impact 
on the rights to privacy and data protection. 
The changes proposed by Timothy Kirkhope in the revised draft report include: 
 The scope of the proposal is narrowed to cover terror offences and serious 
"transnational" crime (the list of specific offences includes, for instance, 
trafficking in human beings, child pornography, trafficking in weapons, 
munitions and explosives); 
 Sensitive data to be permanently deleted no later than 30 days from the last 
receipt of PNR containing such data by competent authorities. Other data will 
continue to be masked after 30 days; 
 The inclusion of intra-EU flights (not initially included by the Commission, but 
the Council of the European Union favours the inclusion of internal EU flights); 
 100% coverage of flights (the Commission text proposed to reach 100% 
coverage of international flights in gradual steps); 
 Access to the PNR data continues to be allowed for five years for terrorism, but 
is reduced to four years for serious crime; 
 Each EU Member State should appoint a data protection supervisory officer; 
 Persons who operate security controls, who access and analyse the PNR data, 
and operate the data logs, must be security cleared, and security trained; 
 References are made in the text to the EU Court of Justice judgment on data 
retention and to the current EU data protection rules; and, 
 The period for member states to transpose the directive is extended from two to 
three years (given the specific technological and structural demands of setting 
up an EU PNR system for each member state).  
It is understandable why the revised draft included serious transnational crime as well as 
terrorism as offences such as the trafficking of human beings causes great suffering to those 
who are being trafficked. However, the trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives can 
be linked to terrorism investigations. The wider the inclusion of offences thereby giving 
greater access to PNR data, there is the potential for wider data mining and profiling of EU 
citizens. The advantage of linking PNR data access to terrorism investigations minimises 
potential abuse in the collection and retention of PNR data. By having tighter control in the 
data’s access by only allowing security and counter-terrorism policing agencies to use the 
data to link passenger connections with known terrorist or terrorist organisations currently on 
intelligence systems again minimises the potential for offender profiling. 
Incorporating some of the points in the revised draft and building on it, it is submitted that 
consideration be given to the following points, which is more likely to conform to data 
privacy and protection law and avert fears of a surveillance society. While keeping from 
Kirkhope’s revised draft that each EU Member State appoint a data protection supervisory 
officer, persons who have access to PNR data are security cleared and have training, and, that 
in the Directive reference is made to EU Court of Justice and current EU data protection rules, 
a PNR Directive proposal includes: 
 Any amended Directive is solely related to terrorism investigations; 
 The Directive only applies to targeted flights to and from states that border or are 
terrorist conflict zones; 
 The PNR data is only held by competent authorities (who would be Member States’ 
national security agencies and Counter-Terrorism Policing Departments); 
 Requests for PNR data on applicable flights is carried out through and by Europol on 
behalf of the respective Member State competent authority requesting the data; 
 It is necessary that all Member States collect, process and exchange PNR data to 
avoid security gaps as this will contribute towards the security of the EU; 
 All PNR data is handled in accordance with the provisions of  Article 8 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 16 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and article 39 treaty for Union along with article 8 
ECHR; 
 The data is pulled from the PNR data solely for matching purposes in relation to 
terrorism intelligence already in the possession of the Member States’ competent 
authorities. The data cannot be requested for sole purpose offender profiling, thereby 
preventing data mining. 
  
In addition to these suggestions, the sections in Kirkhope’s revised draft referring to 
serious crime is omitted and by targeting flights to or states bordering terrorist conflict 
zones rather than all flights, this reduces the concern over data mining by Member 
States’ competent authorities. The flights that are targeted will be based on intelligence, 
in particular those recognised by Europol from its intelligence source, Schengen 
Information System II. This targeting could be fluid to match travel patterns as 
countries are identified as destinations for those wanting to travel and join terrorist 
groups. The main aim of counter-terrorism investigations is to prevent terrorist acts 
from happening and ensuring that EU Member States’ citizens are safe. Such a proposal 
would enhance this capability and it is submitted this proposal is not only necessary but 
is also a proportionate legislative response to the terrorist threat the EU faces.  
Surveillance of Electronic Communications Data Directive 
 The proposals for a new Surveillance of Electronic Communications Data 
Directive include: 
1. Relevant Member State’s Secretary of State issue an order to ensure that 
communications data from ISP and CSP’s is obtained and made available to 
relevant public authorities (in particular national security and counter-terrorism 
policing agencies) or to facilitate the availability of communications data to be 
obtained from ISP and CSP’s; 
2. Such an order will provide for the obtaining by ISP and CSP’s of 
communications data, the processing, retention or destruction by ISP and CSP’s 
they obtain or hold. Processing here includes the methods used by ISP and 
CSP’s in its reading, organisation, analysis, copying, correction, adaption or 
retrieval and integration with other communications data; 
3. The order to impose requirements in ISP and CSP’s to ensure the 
communications data is disclosed without undue delay, to comply with the order 
while respecting rights to privacy and data protection; 
4. Impose safeguards in relation to ensuring the order is necessary in a democratic 
society and is proportionate to the threat the Member State is facing and 
complies with the qualifications to interfere with the right to an individual’s 
privacy as well as complying with data protection law. This can be achieved by 
judicial scrutiny by a member of the respective Member State’s senior court (on 
behalf of the ECJ) with assistance from Eurojust; 
5. As part of the safeguards, the ISP or CSP can apply via Eurojust to the senior 
judiciary of the Member State making the order where the operator considers 
the order is neither necessary and proportionate, and does not comply with 
rights to privacy and data protection; 
6. Any communications data forwarded onto the relevant Membered State public 
authority is retained for a maximum of 12 months to allow that authority to 
analyse the data with their respective intelligence systems related to terrorism 
activity in order to make any connections with those individuals or groups that 
have been identified as a threat and whose activities are already subject of 
lawful surveillance. This is also to allow for co-operation with third countries’ 
agencies involved in monitoring terrorist activity outside the EU regarding 
intelligence analysis. This can be carried out with the guidance of Europol; 
7. ISP and CSP’s destroy communications data requested by an order when that 
data is no longer authorised for retention by the order in a way it cannot be 
retrieved; 
8. Interception warrants – where a person or a group has been identified by a 
Member State’s national security or counter-terrorism policing agency as being 
involved in terrorist activity the relevant Member State’s Secretary of State my 
authorise an interception of communications warrant  (that includes that person 
or group’s use of electronic communication via social media sources) where it is 
necessary and proportionate to do so in the interests of national security or to 
prevent or detect crime and disorder; 
9. Europol collate all interception warrants so issued and assist the Member State 
public authority by analysing the intelligence assessing potential connections 
with terrorism related intelligence obtained from other Member states and third 
countries; 
10. Safeguards for interception warrants could include verification the warrant is 
lawful by senior members of the Member State’s judiciary, assisted by Eurojust; 
11. Communications data obtained via an interception warrant is retained for a 
period of 12 months. Where the communications data is forming evidence of an 
ongoing investigation that data can be retained longer when it is believed 
necessary to form part of the evidence is any potential criminal trials that may 
result from that investigation.  
Conclusion 
 Following the Snowden revelations in 2013 regarding the electronic 
surveillance practices of the US’ NSA and the UK’s GCHQ, it is understandable there 
is a degree of caution when legislation is considered in granting further surveillance and 
data gathering powers to national security and policing agencies. This is certainly the 
situation for EU bodies when it was revealed that EU Member State leaders and 
citizens were targeted by the NSA and GCHQ. As outlined, the terrorist threat is a 
constantly evolving issue and the current threat, especially from Islamist terror groups 
is severe. In just the early months of 2015 EU Member States have suffered the 
devastating effects of terrorist attacks in Paris (January 2015) and Copenhagen 
(February 2015). This is in addition to the Member States counter-terrorism agencies, 
supported by Europol, preventing terrorist attacks during this period. When senior 
figures of security and policing agencies are openly expressing their concerns over their 
respective agency’s capability to consistently prevent attacks under the current 
surveillance related legal framework, these expression should not be ignored. As 
covered, with the ever increasing number of EU citizens flying to or returning from 
countries bordering states containing Islamist terror groups’ bases, an introduction of a 
PNR Directive would go some way to aid security and counter-terrorism policing 
agencies in identifying individuals who may pose a security threat. In addition to the 
proposals for the data protection Regulations and Directives that will be introduced in 
2016, the EU already has in place legal provisions to protect personal data. The 
recommendation submitted here of a new PNR Directive that is applicable only to 
terrorism related activity, along with minimal data retention and intelligence analysis 
linked to suspects already on intelligence systems would help to protect personal data 
as well as going some way to aiding those agencies’ investigations into acts of 
terrorism. Enhancing the capability of preventing terrorist acts enhances further EU 
Member States’ agencies capability of protecting EU citizens, especially in protecting 
their right to life. The right to life is just as important as the right to privacy.  
 
